“Unconstitutional Beyond A Reasonable Doubt” – A Misleading Mantra that Should Be Gone for Good by Spitzer, Hugh
Washington Law Review Online 
Volume 96 Article 5 
2021 
“Unconstitutional Beyond A Reasonable Doubt” – A Misleading 
Mantra that Should Be Gone for Good 
Hugh Spitzer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlro 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Judges Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Legal History 
Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, Rule of Law Commons, and the State and Local 
Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hugh Spitzer, “Unconstitutional Beyond A Reasonable Doubt” – A Misleading Mantra that Should Be Gone 
for Good, 96 WASH. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2021). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlro/vol96/iss1/5 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review Online by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jafrank@uw.edu. 
Spitzer (Do Not Delete) 3/22/2021 12:31 PM 
 
1 
“UNCONSTITUTIONAL BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT” – A MISLEADING MANTRA THAT SHOULD BE 
GONE FOR GOOD 
Hugh Spitzer* 
Abstract: For a century, Washington State Supreme Court opinions periodically have 
intoned that the body will not invalidate a statute on constitutional grounds unless it is 
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” This odd declaration invokes an evidentiary 
standard of proof as a rule of decision for a legal question of constitutionality, and it confuses 
practitioners and the public alike. “Unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” is not peculiar 
to Washington State. Indeed, it began appearing in state court decisions in the early nineteenth 
century and, rarely, in opinions of the United States Supreme Court. But the use of the phrase 
rapidly increased after an 1893 Harvard Law Review article by Professor James Bradley 
Thayer, who promoted it as a constitutional rule or standard because he wanted to reduce 
judicial rejection of progressive legislation. In Washington State, “unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt” increased steadily during and after the 1930s but remains controversial. In 
two opinions, Island County v. State in 1998, and School Districts’ Alliance v. State in 2010, 
members of the Washington State Supreme Court wrestled with whether it makes sense to 
invoke an evidentiary standard in constitutional dialogue. In Island County, some asserted that 
the declaration only meant the Court would not overrule the legislature unless the judges were 
fully convinced of unconstitutionality after a searching analysis. One called it “simply a 
hortatory expression” meant as a nod to elected lawmakers. In split School Districts’ Alliance 
opinions, a majority of the justices criticized the practice. This short Essay argues that 
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” should be permanently erased from the 
Washington State Supreme Court’s vocabulary because it confuses people, is perhaps a bit 
disingenuous, and judges should say what they mean. Finally, the Court regularly uses other 
more workable standards, and those should replace “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable 
doubt” forever. 
INTRODUCTION 
Every lawyer has a professional pet peeve. Mine is a purported standard 
of constitutional application that I find senseless, misleading, and even a 
bit disingenuous. 
Washington State Supreme Court opinions periodically assert that the 
justices will not declare a statute unconstitutional unless they have 
determined the measure is “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
For years, I found this puzzling. Everyone is familiar with “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” as the standard required to convict a criminal 
defendant. But why would an appellate court apply the factual standard 
 
* Professor Hugh Spitzer teaches at the University of Washington School of Law. The author thanks 
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for guilt to a pure question of law? Is a contentious constitutional question 
ever resolved “beyond a reasonable doubt”? How can a five-vote majority 
opinion declare a legislative action unconstitutional “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” in the face of a thoughtful, well-reasoned dissent that merely failed 
to garner that fifth vote? Is the majority suggesting that their minority 
colleagues are unreasonable numbskulls? 
Washington State jurists have not invoked this standard without 
thought—they debated it robustly in 1998 in Island County v. State1 and 
twelve years later in School Districts’ Alliance v. State.2 In Island County, 
Justice Richard Guy declared that unconstitutionality “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” was not an evidentiary standard but instead voiced the 
principle that the Washington State Supreme Court was “hesitant to strike 
a duly enacted statute unless fully convinced, after a searching legal 
analysis, that the statute violates the constitution.”3 
So . . . why doesn’t the Court say what it means, drop “unconstitutional 
beyond a reasonable doubt,” and just stick with “fully convinced after a 
searching legal analysis”? 
I used to think the unconstitutional-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt concept 
was an odd fluke of Washington courts, some mantra that had been 
thoughtlessly dropped into a decision and then invoked from time to time 
when the Washington State Supreme Court wanted to remind legislators 
and the public that judges do not void statutes without a really 
good reason. 
But I was wrong. The unconstitutional-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
jingle turns out to have a long history, back to 1893 and beyond. While it 
never took much hold at the federal level, many state courts continue to 
recite the “doctrine.” 
In this short Essay, I recount the origin of unconstitutional-beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt in an 1893 law review article by James Bradley Thayer, 
a progressive Harvard law professor who wanted to trim the sails of 
activist conservative justices on the United States Supreme Court. We will 
see how Professor Thayer’s theory influenced the judicial discretion 
thinking of a handful of colleagues, students, and acolytes including 
Oliver Wendall Holmes, Jr., Louis Brandeis, and Felix Frankfurter. Later 
commentators have shown that the “standard” did not stand the test of 
time. It has been shredded by legal heavyweights like Yale Law School’s 
Charles L. Black, Jr. in 1960,4 and federal appeals court Judge Richard A. 
 
1. 135 Wash. 2d 141, 955 P.2d 377 (1998). 
2. 170 Wash. 2d 599, 244 P.3d 1 (2010). 
3. Island Cnty., 135 Wash. 2d at 147, 955 P.2d at 380. 
4. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY 
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Posner in 2012.5 While “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” 
continues to pop up like a zombie at the state court level, I hope to 
convince you that it deserves a permanent burial and replacement with the 
standard the Supreme Court of Washington really uses: a statute is 
invalidated when the court is “fully convinced, after a searching legal 
analysis” that the law is unconstitutional. 
I. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER: GOOD MAN, BAD IDEA 
James Bradley Thayer (1831–1902) was an enlightened New 
Englander through and through. His father was a newspaper publisher and 
friend of the abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison.6 As a child, the poet 
John Greenleaf Whittier lodged with Thayer’s family.7 Thayer went to 
Harvard and then Harvard Law School, graduating at the head of his 
class.8 As a young Boston lawyer, he married Ralph Waldo Emerson’s 
niece and in 1871 took Emerson on a pleasure and lecture tour of the far 
west, visiting San Francisco and Yosemite Valley.9 That jaunt resulted in 
a delightful little book, A Western Journey with Mr. Emerson.10 Thayer 
belonged to Boston’s famous Metaphysical Club, the philosophical 
debating society frequented by William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, 
and Thayer’s young law firm associate Oliver Wendall Holmes, Jr.11 He 
contributed to leading progressive literary and political magazines,12 
advocated for Native American rights,13 and was active with other Boston 
intellectuals in the “Mugwump” movement of progressive Republicans 
who switched to the Democratic Party.14 
 
193–209 (1960). For a variety of views on the validity and impact of Thayer’s work, see One Hundred 
Years of Judicial Review: The Thayer Centennial Symposium, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1993). Other 
thoughtful articles on the topic that are not otherwise discussed in this Essay include Vicki C. Jackson, 
Thayer, Holmes, Brandeis: Conceptions of Judicial Review, Factfinding, and Proportionality, 130 
HARV. L. REV. 2348 (2017); Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in 
State and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656 (2000); Maimon Schwarzschild, 
Pluralism, Conversation, and Judicial Restraint, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 961 (2001). 
5. Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 519, 533–
50 (2012). 
6. Jay Hook, A Brief Life of James Bradley Thayer, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1993). 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 2. 
9. Id. at 4; JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A WESTERN JOURNEY WITH MR. EMERSON 46, 53 (1884). 
10. See Hook, supra note 6, at 4 n.20 (citing THAYER, supra note 9). 
11. Id. at 4.  
12. Id. at 5. 
13. Wallace Mendelson, The Influence of James B. Thayer upon the Work of Holmes, Brandeis, 
and Frankfurter, 31 VAND. L. REV. 71, 71 (1978); Hook, supra note 6, at 7. 
14. Hook, supra note 6, at 6. 
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As a lawyer, Thayer successfully argued for government eminent 
domain rights in the public interest, environmental and work safety 
standards, and public control of limitations on privately-owned utilities.16 
As a scholar, he collaborated with Holmes on the twelfth edition of Kent’s 
famous Commentaries on American Law.17 In 1872, Dean Christopher 
Columbus Langdell recruited him onto the Harvard Law School faculty.18 
There, Thayer became a beloved teacher and a scholar on a variety of 
subjects, writing the first casebook on American constitutional law and 
the preliminary version of an evidence treatise later completed by his 
student John Henry Wigmore.19 Another of his star pupils was Louis 
Brandeis, who taught Thayer’s evidence class when the latter was in 
England studying the British Constitution and parliamentary democracy.20 
Brandeis, a crusading progressive lawyer and future United States 
Supreme Court justice, became a close friend of Thayer’s.21 
James Bradley Thayer was not a detached ivory-tower intellectual. He 
was not conservative—indeed, he was an engaged, politically active 
 
15. James  Bradley  Thayer,  1831–1902,  LIBR.  OF  CONG.,  https://www.loc.gov/ 
pictures/item/2004674990/ [https://perma.cc/3GKR-C7HU].  
16. Id.  
17. Id.  
18. Id.  
19. Id. (citing JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (1904)); see also 
Mendelson, supra note 13, at 71. 
20. See Hook, supra note 6, at 5. 
21. Mendelson, supra note 13, at 73–74, 76. 
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progressive. But in 1893 he authored a piece in the Harvard Law Review 
that Felix Frankfurter labeled the “most important single essay” on 
American constitutional law.22 Thayer’s piece, The Origin and Scope of 
the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,23 was written as a counter-
attack against the activist, pro-business, anti-labor, and anti-regulatory 
majority on the United States Supreme Court.24 This discourse by a 
progressive, public-minded law professor—just the sort of fellow I like—
forcefully promoted my unconstitutional-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt pet 
peeve. What’s going on here? 
In his 1893 article, Thayer attempted to reconstruct American legal 
history to demonstrate the existence of a federal doctrine that in fact had 
never been consistently established or applied. In short, he argued that the 
Supreme Court would not strike down a federal statute unless the jurists 
were convinced that the measure was “unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”25 His argument relied on the Supreme Court’s respect 
for Congress, and was based on the presumption that the lawmakers would 
thoughtfully consider the constitutionality of proposed legislation.26 
Thayer urged that when considering the constitutionality of a statute, the 
Supreme Court’s ultimate job “is not [to determine] what is the true 
meaning of the constitution, but whether legislation is sustainable or 
not.”27 He observed that a legislative body often has “a range of choice 
and judgment; that in such cases the constitution does not impose upon 
the legislature any one specific opinion, but leaves open this range of 
choice; and that whatever choice is rational is constitutional.”28 Thayer 
concluded that judges can overturn a legislative act as unconstitutional 
“when those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a 
mistake, but have made a very clear one,—so clear that it is not open to 
rational question.”29 
Thayer appears to have proposed this beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
doctrine because he hoped that if it gained acceptance, the United States 
Supreme Court would refrain from interfering with Congressional acts in 
 
22. SANFORD BYRON GABIN, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE REASONABLE DOUBT TEST 5 (1980) 
(citation omitted). 
23. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 
HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). 
24. See Hook, supra note 6, at 7. 
25. Thayer, supra note 23, at 151. 
26. See id. at 136, 142. 
27. Id. at 150 (emphasis omitted). 
28. Id. at 144. 
29. Id. 
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aid of disadvantaged groups,30 such as the Court’s 1883 invalidation of 
federal civil rights laws in The Civil Rights Cases.31 If that was Thayer’s 
goal, he must have been disappointed when, for example, the anti-
regulatory majority on the Supreme Court in 1895 demolished the 
Sherman Antitrust Act’s application to the manufacturing sector.32 But he 
vigorously contended in his Harvard Law Review article that American 
courts historically had taken an extremely deferential approach to the 
constitutionality of legislative enactments—notwithstanding the much 
better known Marbury v. Madison33 doctrine.34 
Remember that in Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall held for a 
unanimous Court that it was “emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is,”35 that a written constitution is 
“superior, paramount law” that supersedes an ordinary statute,36 and 
therefore, 
if both the [statute] and the constitution apply to a particular 
case . . . the court must either decide that case conformably to the 
[statute], disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the 
constitution, disregarding the [statute]; the court must determine 
which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the 
very essence of judicial duty.37 
In other words, Marshall reasoned that the Court should analyze a statute 
in light of the superior Constitution and make a reasoned judgment as to 
whether the statute is consistent with that Constitution. And that is what 







30. See Hook, supra note 6, at 6. 
31. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Civil Rights Cases were five individual cases challenging the 1875 Civil 
Rights Act. That statute had outlawed discrimination on the basis of race, color, or previous condition 
of servitude in the use of transportation, lodging, and amusement facilities. Id. at 9. In its decision, 
Supreme Court ruled that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments applied only to “state action” 
and not to activities of private individuals or entities. Id. at 11. This substantially reduced the 
effectiveness of Congress to enforce that amendment through statutory protections for former slaves 
and others. 
32. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12–18 (1895). 
33. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
34. Id. at 177. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 178. 
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But Thayer relegated Marbury v. Madison to a footnote and dismissed 
it as “overpraised,” undercutting Marshall’s rationale for judicial 
review.39 He then tried to show that later jurists had supplemented and 
corrected Marbury by imposing a “rule of administration” that limited 
judicial annulment of Congressional statutes to situations where the 
unconstitutionality was so clear that it was not open to rational question.40 
He cited a Pennsylvania decision from 1811 to the effect that “an Act of 
the legislature is not to be declared void unless the violation of the 
 
38. File:  Chief  Justice  John  Marshall,  WIKIMEDIA  COMMONS,  https://commons.wikimedia 
.org/w/index.php?curid=60889951 [https://perma.cc/YF4J-CKHN]. 
39. Thayer, supra note 23, at 130 n.1. For a lively critique of Thayer’s approach to Marbury v. 
Madison, see Gary Lawson, Thayer Versus Marshall, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 221, 222 (1993) (asserting 
that Thayer “affirmatively ridiculed Marbury’s argument for judicial review” without good reason). 
40. See Thayer, supra note 23, at 144. Interestingly, Thayer did not contend that his restrictive “rule 
of administration” applied to United States Supreme Court review of state laws because the federal 
high court was not a coordinate department at the same level as a state legislature. See id. at 152–55. 
Thus, the Supreme Court could balance a state statute against the language of the Constitution and 
freely overturn the judgment of state legislators. Id. He did suggest it was plausible that state supreme 
courts could appropriately use his deferential “rule of administration” when examining their own state 
legislatures’ enactments. Id. at 155. 
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constitution is so manifest as to leave no room for reasonable doubt.”41 He 
quoted from an 1808 opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia suggesting 
that if it were “doubtful whether the legislature [has or has not] trespassed 
on the constitution, a conflict ought to be avoided” because the legislature 
might have been correct.42 Thayer listed an 1812 South Carolina case 
opining that the validity of a law should not be questioned unless it is “so 
obviously repugnant to the constitution” that “all men of sense and 
reflection” can perceive that repugnancy.43 Finally, he relied on the 
respected Massachusetts jurist Lemuel Shaw, who in 1834 declared that 
“courts will . . . never declare a statute void unless the nullity and 
invalidity are placed beyond reasonable doubt.”44 
Thayer offered these and a handful of other state cases that used the 
unconstitutional-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt jingle or something close to 
it.45 He also mentioned a United States Supreme Court decision in which 
Chief Justice Waite remarked in 1878 that: 
Every possible presumption is in favor of the validity of a statute, 
and this continues until the contrary is shown beyond a rational 
doubt. One branch of the government cannot encroach on the 
domain of another without danger. The safety of our institutions 
depends in no small degree on a strict observance of this salutary 
rule.46 
Although Waite’s language was referred to in several state court cases, 
Thayer did not cite any United States Supreme Court cases in which the 
expression “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” had been 
adhered to by a majority of justices.47 As Professor Charles Black 
documented in a 1960 book,48 Thayer misrepresented the few Supreme 
Court cases he discussed, and there was a 
striking absence of precedents in which Thayer’s rule actually 
was applied . . . . If Thayer’s “rule” really had been a “rule,” you 
would expect to find a torrent of such cases. You will not find 
 
41. Id. at 140 (citing Commonwealth ex rel. O’Hara v. Smith, 4 Binn. 117, 123 (Pa. 1811)). 
42. Id. at 141 (alteration in original) (citing Grimball v. Ross, T.U.P. Charlton R. 175, 178 (Liberty 
Cnty. Super. Ct. 1808)). 
43. Id. at 142 (citing Byrne’s Adm’rs v. Stewart’s Adm’rs, 3 S.C. Eq. (3 Des. Eq.) 466, 477 (1812)). 
44. Id. at 146 (alteration in original) (citing In re Wellington, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 87, 95 (1834)). 
45. See id. at 142 n.1. 
46. Id. (quoting The Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1878)). 
47. Id. Thayer quoted Justice Washington’s opinion in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 270 (1827), 
a split decision from which Chief Justice Marshall dissented—his only dissent in Supreme Court 
history because of his strong belief in the United States Supreme Court presenting a united front. See 
ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 25 (5th ed. 2010); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789–1888, at 150–51 (1985). 
48. BLACK, supra note 4, at 196–99. 
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them cited by Thayer. I venture to say you will find very few if 
any of them anywhere else.49 
Most of the United States Supreme Court majority or lead opinions that 
Thayer did cite used a different sort of language. Thayer recounted that in 
1796, Justice Samuel Chase stated that if the Court possessed the power 
to declare a statute unconstitutional, he would not exercise that power “but 
in a very clear case,”50 i.e., a clearly unconstitutional or “clarity” 
approach. Thayer also noted that Justice William Paterson in 1800 had 
suggested that for “this Court to pronounce any law void, it must be a clear 
and unequivocal breach of the constitution, not a doubtful and 
argumentative implication.”51 Thayer further invoked Thomas Cooley’s 
prominent nineteenth century treatise on constitutional limitations.52 But 
when one examines what Cooley actually proposed as a guideline, it was 
simply that legislators should carefully resolve their own doubts about the 
constitutionality of proposed legislation and that “the courts should 
sustain legislative action when not clearly satisfied of its invalidity.”53 
Cooley also wrote that it was “the duty of the court to uphold a statute 
when the conflict between it and the constitution is not clear,” and that a 
court “if possible, must give the statute such a construction as will enable 
it to have effect.”54 
But Chase, Paterson, and Cooley’s arguments—essentially that statutes 
should only be found unconstitutional in crystal-clear cases—are not the 
same as stating that laws should be overturned only if judges find them 
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” or only if the 
unconstitutionality is “so clear that it is not open to rational question.” It 
is difficult to find a federal or state supreme court split decision where the 
dissenters’ views are so frivolous that they are without any rational 
arguments whatsoever. 
Professor (and retired federal appeals court judge) Richard A. Posner 
has written a forceful take-down of Thayer’s unconstitutional-beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt.55 He suggests that Thayer’s idea initially gained some 
 
49. Id. at 196 (emphasis in original). 
50. Thayer, supra note 23, at 141 (quoting Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171, 175 (1796) 
(emphasis omitted)). 
51. Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. 14, 19 (1800); Thayer, supra note 23, at 141. 
52. Thayer, supra note 23, at 142 n.1 (citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE 
AMERICAN UNION 216 (6th ed. 1890)). 
53. COOLEY, supra note 52, at 217. 
54. Id. at 218. 
55. Posner, supra note 5. Thayer receives more sympathetic treatment from Sanford Byron Gabin. 
See GABIN, supra note 22. 
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credence because “there were no cogent theories of how to decide a 
difficult case.”56 But Posner pointed out that “once you embraced 
[Thayer’s approach], you could not explain why a law would ever be 
declared unconstitutional.”57 While Thayer had admirers such as Holmes, 
Brandeis, and Frankfurter, Posner demonstrated how each of them, when 
serving on the Supreme Court, were altogether inconsistent in their 
“Thayerism” and in practice applied other deference standards, tending to 
defer to Congress on regulatory actions while overturning national and 
state laws that interfered with civil rights and liberties.58 Posner observed 
that judicial deference diminished during the Warren Court years,59 but 
acquiescence to lawmakers was not revived by subsequent conservative 
justices who wanted to roll back Warren Court decisions and sustain a 
rightward agenda.60 Posner pointed out that despite their claims of judicial 
restraint and deference to elected legislators, none of the conservatives on 
the United States Supreme Court would say, “I think the original meaning 
of the Second Amendment is that people have a right to own guns for self-
defense, and the challenged statute . . . doesn’t permit that, but reasonable 
persons might disagree with my reading of history, so I’ll vote to uphold 
the enactment.”61 
In other words, no one on America’s contemporary high court applies 
Thayer’s unconstitutional-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt theory. And it 
turns out that, despite the lip service given to the concept when a statute 
is overturned, no one on the Washington State Supreme Court really 
applies Thayer’s theory either. 
II. THAYERISM IN WASHINGTON STATE (AND WHY IT 
SHOULD VANISH) 
The last United States Supreme Court opinion that voiced the 
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” standard (or something 
close to it) was in 1958, when Justice William O. Douglas alluded to Chief 
Justice Waite’s 1878 remark that “[e]very possible presumption is in favor 
of the validity of a statute, and this continues until the contrary is shown 
beyond a rational doubt.”62 While two earlier United States Supreme 
 
56. Posner, supra note 5, at 522. 
57. Id.  
58. Id. at 525–31. 
59. Id. at 546. 
60. Id. at 547. 
61. Id. at 537. 
62. Fed. Hous. Admin. v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 90–91 (1958) (quoting The Sinking-Fund 
Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1878)).  
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Court opinions used similar language,63 none used the exact terms 
“beyond a reasonable doubt.” The language appeared in two Supreme 
Court opinions before Thayer’s article (both by Justice John Harlan),64 
and just nine times after 1893—all save one in dissents.65 
But Thayerism definitely survives at the state level—at least in words. 
University of Mississippi Professor Christopher R. Green has documented 
the use of unconstitutional-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt at least once in 
almost every state since 1811.66 I have reviewed the recent use of the 
formulation in each state since 2000, and in this century, high court 
opinions in thirty-six states included a statement that the relevant court 
has applied (or said it applied) a version of unconstitutional-beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt.67 
 
63. The United States Supreme Court opinions voiced the concept of unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable (or rational) doubt in just two opinions before Waite’s use of the formulation: Ogden v. 
Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 270 (1827) (Washington, J., majority opinion), and The Legal Tender Cases, 
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 531 (1870).  
64. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 27 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing The Sinking-Fund 
Cases, 99 U.S. at 718); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684 (1888) (Harlan, J., majority 
opinion) (citing The Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. at 718).   
65. Cases mentioning the formulation after Thayer’s article included: Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & 
Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 699 (1895) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 106 (1897) 
(Brown, J., dissenting) (citing The Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. at 718); Howard v. Illinois Central 
Railroad Co., 207 U.S. 463, 510–11 (1908) (Moody, J., dissenting); Detroit United Railway Co. v. 
Detroit, 248 U.S. 429, 442 (1919) (Clarke, J., dissenting); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 
299 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting); Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266, 278 (1936) 
(Cardozo, J., dissenting); Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District, 298 U.S. 513, 540 
(1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 354–55 
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); and Federal Housing Administration v. Darlington, 358 U.S. 84, 
90–91 (1958). The last and most recent decision, Federal Housing Administration v. Darlington, was 
based almost entirely on statutory construction, upholding a statute and regulations banning FHA-
financed apartments from being rented to transients. 358 U.S. 84, 85–91 (1958). The “beyond a 
rational doubt” language appears in Justice Douglas’ opinion as a throw-away line. Id. at 91. 
66. See Christopher R. Green, Clarity and Reasonable Doubt in Early State-Constitutional Judicial 
Review, 57 S. TEX. L. REV. 169, 179–82 (2015). The earliest use of the formulation in state court was 
in Commonwealth ex rel. O’Hara v. Smith, 4 Binn. 117 (Pa. 1811). See Green, supra, at 179. 
67. See City of Daphne v. City of Spanish Fort, 853 So. 2d 933, 943 (Ala. 2003); In re Leon G., 59 
P.3d 779, 783 (Ariz. 2002); TABOR Found. v. Reg’l Transp. Dist., 2018 CO 29, ¶¶ 12–13, 416 P.3d 
101, 104; State v. McCleese, 215 A.3d 1154, 1178 (Conn. 2019); Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Am. Bus. 
USA Corp., 191 So. 3d 906, 911 (Fla. 2016); State v. Pacquing, 389 P.3d 897, 902 (Haw. 2016); State 
v. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226, 233 (Iowa 2002); State v. Bennett, 125 P.3d 522, 525 (Idaho 
2005); State v. Timbs, 134 N.E.3d 12, 23 (Ind. 2019); Hall v. Dillon Cos., 189 P.3d 508, 517 (Kan. 
2008); Shepherd v. Shidler, 2015-1750 (La. 1/27/16), 209 So. 3d 752, 766, aff’d on reh’g (May 2, 
2016); Goggin v. State Tax Assessor, 2018 ME 111 ¶ 20, 191 A.3d 341, 346–47; Atwater v. Comm’r 
of Educ., 957 N.E.2d 1060, 1067 (Mass. 2011); People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 813 (Mich. 2014); 
Soohoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815, 821 (Minn. 2007); Mauldin v. Branch, 2002-CA-00146-SCT 
(¶ 21) (Miss. 2003), 866 So. 2d 429, 435; Hernandez v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2008 MT 251, ¶ 15, 
345 Mont. 1, 6, 189 P.3d 638, 642–43; State v. Hynek, 640 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Neb. 2002); Miller v. Burk, 
188 P.3d 1112, 1123 (Nev. 2008); Hynes v. Hale, 776 A.2d 722, 726 (N.H. 2001); Commc’ns 
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There are other standards for overturning statutes, and some bear a 
resemblance to what appeals courts actually do when faced with an 
assertion that an enactment is unconstitutional. Professor Green has 
shown how the states intertwine unconstitutional-beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt with other formulations for presuming the constitutionality of 
statutes.68 The oldest and most popular approach has been the clarity 
approach (requiring a clear, plain, manifest or evident instance of 
unconstitutionality).69 But let’s zero in on Washington State, where the 
Washington State Supreme Court voices a variety of standards, often 
within the same opinion. 
The earliest Washington State cases referencing Cooley’s admonition 
about caution and resolving all doubts before overturning statutes were 
decided early in the state’s history in Board of Directors of Middle Kittitas 
Irrigation District v. Peterson70 and State ex rel. School District No. 24 of 
Snohomish County v. Grimes.71 In 1894 a year after Grimes, the 
Washington State Supreme Court in State ex rel. McReavy v. Burke72 
voiced the more common “clarity” formulation.73 That opinion stated that 
“it is well settled that the courts will approach [questions of constitutional 
invalidity] with the greatest caution, and . . . acts of the legislature will not 
be held void or unconstitutional unless the question is directly involved, 
and the conflict clearly apparent.”74 
There was an uptick in the explicit use of “beyond a rational doubt” 
and “beyond a reasonable doubt” as Washington moved into the 
Progressive Era of the early twentieth century and the Washington State 
 
Workers of Am. v. N.J. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 191 A.3d 643, 661 (N.J. 2018); Rodriguez v. Brand W. 
Dairy, 2016-NMSC-029 ¶ 10, 378 P.3d 13, 19; Cnty. of Chemung v. Shah, 66 N.E.3d 1044, 1051 
(N.Y. 2016); State v. Grady, 831 S.E.2d 542, 553 (N.C. 2019); State v. Blue, 2018 ND 171 ¶ 19, 915 
N.W.2d 122, 128; State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St. 3d 507, 2007-Ohio-606, 861 N.E.2d 512, at ¶ 17; Shah 
v. City of Okla. City, 2019 OK 65, ¶ 7, 451 P.3d 161, 166; Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1045 
(R.I. 2004); In re Treatment & Care of Luckabaugh, 568 S.E.2d 338, 334 (S.C. 2002); Meinders v. 
Weber, 2000 SD 2, ¶ 10, 604 N.W.2d 248, 254; McCarver v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 208 S.W.3d 380, 384 
(Tenn. 2006); Anderson v. U.P.S., 2004 UT 57, ¶ 7, 96 P.3d 903, 906; Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. 
Smit, 689 S.E.2d 679, 684 (Va. 2010); State ex rel. Gallagher Bassett Servs., Inc. v. Webster, 829 
S.E.2d 290, 297 (W. Va. 2019); In re Commitment of Dennis H., 2002 WI 104, ¶ 12, 647 N.W.2d 
851, 856; Sheesley v. State, 2019 WY 32, ¶ 3, 437 P.3d 830, 833 (Wyo. 2019). But see Gallardo v. 
State, 336 P.3d 717, 720 (Ariz. 2014) (ending use of “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” 
in Arizona). 
68. Green, supra note 66, at 175–76. 
69. Id. at 181. 
70. 4 Wash. 147, 149–50, 29 P. 995, 995–96 (1892). 
71. 7 Wash. 270, 274, 34 P. 836, 837–38 (1893). 
72. 8 Wash. 412, 36 P. 281 (1894). 
73. Id. at 419, 36 P. at 283. 
74. Id. 
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Supreme Court shifted from blocking government regulations to 
consistently upholding state laws protecting consumers, female 
employees, and workers in hazardous industries.75 This was precisely the 
use of Thayer’s doctrine of deference to legislatures that the progressive 
Bostonian had desired. For example, in Holzman v. City of Spokane,76 
sustaining a local improvement district lien statute against a subject-in-
title challenge, the progressive Justice Emmett Parker77 in 1916 wrote: 
This court has always liberally construed the constitutional 
requirement that the subject-matter of an act of the Legislature 
shall be expressed in its title, and has deferred to legislative 
discretion touching that requirement, except in cases of its 
plainest violation. The doctrine that all reasonable doubts as to the 
constitutionality of an act of the Legislature should be resolved in 
favor of upholding the act has peculiar force in the solution of the 
question of whether or not the act has been in form 
constitutionally passed, because such a constitutional question 
has to do with legislative procedure. In other words, it has to do 
with the methods of transacting public business by a co-ordained 
branch of the state government, and not with those constitutional 
guaranties of personal rights which it is the peculiar province of 
the courts to protect.78 
Waite’s “beyond a rational doubt” language appeared again in Fisher 
Flouring Mills Co. v. Brown,79 a 1920 decision upholding a law restricting 
the amount of crude fiber added to livestock feed.80 The following year, 
in Parrott & Co. v. Benson,81 the Washington State Supreme Court upheld 
a consumer-protection law on egg labeling, stating, “it is well settled that 
the courts will not declare a statute to be unconstitutional unless its 
conflict with the Constitution is plain beyond a reasonable doubt.”82 These 
cases reflected the Washington State Supreme Court’s early twentieth 
century Progressive shift in favor of consumer and worker protections. 
After Parrott there was a twelve-year gap in use of the 
 
75. See Hugh Spitzer, Pivoting to Progressivism: Justice Stephen J. Chadwick, the Washington 
Supreme Court, and Change in Early 20th-Century Judicial Reasoning and Rhetoric, 104 PAC. NW. 
Q. 107, 115–17 (2013). 
76. 91 Wash. 418, 157 P. 1086 (1916). 
77. For a short biography of Justice Emmett Parker and his tendency towards “moderate-to-liberal 
stances,” see CHARLES H. SHELDON, THE WASHINGTON HIGH BENCH: A BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY OF 
THE STATE SUPREME COURT, 1889–1991, at 271–72 (1992). 
78. Holzman, 91 Wash. at 420, 157 P. at 1087. 
79. 109 Wash. 680, 694–95, 187 P. 399, 403–04 (1920). 
80. See id. at 698, 187 P. at 405. 
81. 114 Wash. 117, 194 P. 986 (1921). 
82. Id. at 122, 194 P. at 988. 
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unconstitutional-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt concept. From 1933 forward 
the use of the phrase steadily increased,83 accelerating since the 1990s—
often in politically controversial cases.84 Since 1933, the Washington high 
court has invoked the constitutional (or unconstitutional) beyond a 
reasonable doubt mantra seventy-one times in civil cases, reciting it in 
fifty-seven cases upholding laws or government actions, and just fourteen 
cases overturning statutes or initiatives.85 I have reviewed the use of 
unconstitutional-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt by state supreme courts 
since 2000, and Washington, with forty-two references, is fifth highest 
nationally during that period.86 
But the underlying purpose of using the standard seems to have 
changed since the Progressive Era—shifting from a conscious deference 
to the legislative branch and voters, to an incantation for cosmetic 
purposes in constitutional cases involving high-profile issues. The more 
frequent reference to the standard in upholding government actions 
suggests that justices are applying it when they want to give a nod to 
public concerns, announcing, in essence, that “the Devil made me do it” 
in acting to sustain a law that is unpopular with one interest group or 
another. At the same time, justices on the Washington State Supreme 
Court have not hesitated to invalidate legislation and initiatives on state 
constitutional grounds without stating that they have determined it is 
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.”87 Among the state supreme 
 
83. See Robb v. City of Tacoma, 175 Wash. 580, 599, 28 P.2d 327, 334 (1933) (upholding the 
validity of a voted general obligation bond issue). 
84. See, e.g., Leonard v. Spokane, 127 Wash. 2d 194, 197–98, 897 P.2d 358, 360 (1995) 
(overturning a tax increment financing law); Gerberding v. Munro, 134 Wash. 2d 188, 196, 949 P.2d 
1366, 1370 (1998) (invalidating an initiative setting term limits for elected officials); Island Cnty. v. 
State, 135 Wash. 2d 141, 146–47, 955 P.2d 377, 380 (1998) (rejecting a community council system 
in counties); Belas v. Kiga, 135 Wash. 2d 913, 920, 959 P.2d 1037, 1041 (1998) (holding a value-
averaging system of real property assessment in violation of constitutional tax uniformity 
requirements); Amalgamated Transit Union v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 183, 205, 11 P.3d 762, 780 (2000) 
(rejecting Initiative 695 limits on tax increases); Auto. United Trades Org. v. State, 175 Wash. 2d 
537, 545, 286 P.3d 377, 381 (2012) (upholding a tax on first possession of petroleum in the state); 
League of Educ. Voters v. State, 176 Wash. 2d 808, 820–21, 295 P.3d 743, 749 (2013) (invalidating 
an initiative’s requirement for supermajority legislative passage of tax increases). 
85. A spreadsheet listing each Washington State Supreme Court case in which the unconstitutional-
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt formulation appeared, is available at: Washington Unconstitutional 
BARD–WA, UNIV. OF WASH. L. SCH., https://www.law.uw.edu/media/142145/washington-
unconstitutional-bard-waxlsx-unconstitutional-bard-wa.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2L9-U9JF]. In 
addition, at least 150 Washington Court of Appeals cases have used the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt language. 
86. The five most frequent state users of the formulation are: Montana (74 occurrences); 
Wisconsin (53); Ohio (46); Nebraska (43); and Washington (42).  
87. See Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 496–97, 585 P.2d 71, 83–84 (1978) (finding 
Washington school funding system at odds with state constitutional requirements); McCleary v. State, 
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courts that have actively used the formulation since 2000, at least four 
besides Washington have invalidated statutes without reference to the 
formulation.88 As noted above, it is difficult for a court to be collectively 
“without doubt” when there are thoughtful and cogent arguments 
in dissents. 
In any event, none of Washington’s unconstitutional-beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt cases thoughtfully evaluated whether the legal concept 
really made sense until 1998. In that year, in Island County, Justices 
Richard Guy, Richard Sanders, and Philip Talmadge engaged in a free-
for-all over the meaning and merits of unconstitutional-beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt.89 Justice Guy wrote the majority opinion nullifying a 
statute providing for community councils in counties consisting entirely 
of islands with a population exceeding 30,000.90 The Washington State 
Supreme Court unanimously determined that the law violated the state 
constitution’s ban on special legislation because it applied to only one 
county.91 But the justices disagreed about whether the standard made 
sense. Justice Guy conceded that “whether the community council act is 
special legislation is a close question.”92 Yet at the same time he 
contended that the Court’s “traditional articulation” was that “the burden 
is on the party challenging the statute to prove its unconstitutionality 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”93 How on earth could a “close question” of 
constitutionality be an instance where unconstitutionality was proven 
 
173 Wash. 2d 477, 514–15, 269 P.3d 227, 245–46 (2012) (finding Washington school funding system 
at odds with state constitutional requirements); Spokane Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Bryan, 51 Wash. 498, 
500–07, 99 P. 28, 28–31 (1909) (rejecting special or charter school legislation); League of Women 
Voters of Wash. v. State, 184 Wash. 2d 393, 401, 355 P.3d 1131, 1137 (2015) (rejecting special or 
charter school legislation); Petroleum Lease Props. Co. v. Huse, 195 Wash. 254, 260–61, 80 P.2d 774, 
777 (1938) (holding oil and gas lease regulation provisions in securities legislation to exceed the scope 
of the bill’s title); State ex rel. Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v. Yelle, 32 Wash. 2d 13, 23–26, 200 P.2d 
467, 473 (1948) (rejecting ferry purchase provisions of legislation as outside the bill title); Flanders 
v. Morris, 88 Wash. 2d 183, 191–92, 558 P.2d 769, 774–75 (1977) (invalidating substantive welfare 
reform provisions in budget legislation under state constitution’s single-subject requirement); 
Bennion, Van Camp, Hagan & Ruhl v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 443, 447–54, 635 P.2d 730, 
733–36 (1981) (finding statute regulating escrow officers to conflict with the judiciary’s sole power 
to oversee the practice of law). 
88. These include Alabama, Iowa, Ohio, and West Virginia. See Jefferson Cnty. v. Weissman, 69 
So. 3d 827, 830–45 (Ala. 2011); Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Reynolds ex rel. State, 915 
N.W.2d 206 (Iowa 2018); State ex rel. Espen v. Wood Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 154 Ohio St. 3d 1, 
2017-Ohio-8223, 110 N.E.3d 1222, at ¶ 13–16; State v. Hoyle, 836 S.E.2d 817, 824–26, 829–34 
(W. Va. 2019). 
89. Island Cnty. v. State, 135 Wash. 2d 141, 955 P.2d 377 (1998). 
90. Id. at 155, 955 P.2d at 384. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 146, 955 P.2d at 380. 
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“beyond a reasonable doubt”? But Justice Guy stated, after reciting the 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, that the legislature had likely 
considered the constitutionality of its enactment, and out of respect for 
lawmakers “we are hesitant to strike a duly enacted statute unless fully 



















“Fully convinced after a searching legal analysis” is a far cry from 
“beyond a reasonable doubt.” Those two concepts simply are not the same 
standard. It is likely that the real standard Guy applied was the “fully 
convinced” approach, and that is confirmed by his addition of a citation 
to Marbury v. Madison and a statement that “[u]ltimately . . . the judiciary 
must make the decision, as a matter of law, whether a given statute is 
within the legislature’s power . . . or whether it violates a 
constitutional mandate.”96 
Guy could have easily omitted the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt mantra, 
but perhaps he left it in because he enjoyed the occasional intellectual 
squabble between Justices Sanders and Talmadge. Sanders, with his 
libertarian bent,97 argued that Thayer’s prescription favored the legislative 
 
94. Id. at 147, 955 P.3d at 380 (emphasis added). 
95. Washington State Supreme Court Photograph of Justice Guy (on file with author).  
96. Id. 
97. See Eric Scigliano, The Devil’s Advocate, SEATTLEMET (June 13, 2010), 
https://www.seattlemet.com/news-and-city-life/2010/06/supreme-court-justice-richard-sanders-
charlie-wiggins-0710 [https://perma.cc/4323-UUQN]. 
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branch in a manner dangerous to individual liberties,98 contradicted the 
Hamilton-Marshall concept of independent judicial review,99 and 
established a presumption on a legal issue when presumptions are 
appropriately suited only to factual questions.100 Justice Talmadge, a 
former long-time state senator and advocate for judicial deference to the 
legislature in policy matters,101 opined: 
It should go without saying that when we consider a constitutional 
question, we decide the question as a matter of law, not of fact. In 
the constitutional context, therefore, the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard is obviously not an evidentiary standard; nor was 
it intended to be. It is simply a hortatory expression, a guide for 
our consideration, a reminder that the Legislature—not the 
Court—is the body the people of our state have chosen to make 
their laws.102 
Simply a hortatory expression. Probably true. So why bother? 
The Island County dust-up could have been the end of it, but the 
Washington State Supreme Court’s internal argument about 
unconstitutional-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt resurfaced twelve years later 
in School Districts’ Alliance, which upheld the constitutionality of the 
state’s special education funding process.103 This time there was a 
majority opinion, two concurrences, and a dissent. The three extra 
opinions all debated the usefulness of unconstitutional-beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt, which was critiqued one way or another by a majority 
of the justices. 
In School Districts’ Alliance, Justice Susan Owens stated that the 
mantra “refers to the fact that one challenging a statute must, by argument 
and research, convince the court that there is no reasonable doubt that the 
statute violates the constitution” and reiterated that “this high standard is 
based on our respect for the legislative branch.”104 She also repeated the 
Island County not-so-high standard that beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
“merely means that . . . we will not strike a duly enacted statute unless we 
 
98. Island Cnty., 135 Wash. 2d at 155–56, 955 P.2d at 384. 
99. Id. at 156–57, 955 P.2d at 384–85. 
100. Id. at 159–61, 955 P.2d at 386–87. 
101. See Philip A. Talmadge, Understanding the Limits of Power: Judicial Restraint in General 
Jurisdiction Court Systems, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 695, 697 (1999). A short biography of former 
Justice Talmadge appears at: David Postman, Talmadge to Leave Supreme Court, SEATTLE TIMES 
(May 4, 2000), https://archive.seattletimes.com/archive/?date=20000504&slug=4019060 
[https://perma.cc/E2P4-3ZMF]. 
102. Island Cnty., 135 Wash. 2d at 172, 955 P.2d at 393 (emphasis added). 
103. Sch. Dists.’ All. for Adequate Funding of Special Educ. v. State, 170 Wash. 2d 599, 614, 244 
P.3d 1, 8–9 (2010). 
104. Id. at 605–06, 244 P.3d at 4 (quoting Island Cnty., 135 Wash. 2d at 147, 955 P.2d at 380). 
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are ‘fully convinced, after a searching legal analysis, that the statute 
violates the constitution.’”105 Five justices signed Owens’ opinion. But a 
majority simultaneously signed either one of the concurrences or the 
dissent—all attacking the “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” 
concept. 
Justice Debra Stephens, joined by Justice Mary Fairhurst, asserted that 
the “‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard is unnecessary and 
distracting.”106 She noted an “inherent tension” between the Court’s duty 
to construe the state constitution and its commitment to avoid impinging 
on the legislature’s policy-making role.107 She then engaged in a 
thoughtful discussion of whether the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard 
was “the proper constitutional lens through which to examine positive 
rights” such as Washington State Constitution article IX, section 1’s 
“paramount duty” education clause.108 
Justice Tom Chambers, joined by Justice James Johnson, argued that 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” should be left solely as an evidentiary 
burden on a party.109 He suggested that on legal questions the burden 
should be on the court and not on the individual bringing a challenge.110 
He added that while the court should assume a statute is valid, it should 
“entertain no presumptions against its validity.”111 Justice Richard 
Sanders dissented, repeating his contention in Island County that a 
“presumption of statutory constitutionality favors the legislature at the 
expense of the individual.”112 He referred for support to a 1984 law review 
article by the late Justice Robert Utter in which Justice Utter critiqued 
unconstitutional-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt as an improper application 
of a factual standard to a legal question, and as a standard excessively 
deferential to the legislative and executive branches that might “undercut 
the fundamental rights of Washington citizens.”113 
Is this a tempest in a teapot, rendering excitement over a trivial matter? 
The answer: both yes and no. 
 
105. Id. at 606, 244 P.3d at 5 (quoting Island Cnty., 135 Wash. 2d at 147, 955 P.2d at 380). 
106. Id. at 614, 244 P.3d at 9 (Stephens, J., concurring).  
107. Id. at 615, 244 P.3d at 9. 
108. Id. at 615–16, 244 P.3d at 9–10.  
109. Id. at 617, 244 P.3d at 10 (Chambers, J., concurring in part). 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 617–18, 244 P.3d at 10 (quoting State v. Ide, 35 Wash. 576, 581–82, 77 P. 961, 
962 (1904)). 
112. Id. at 622, 244 P.3d at 13 (Sanders, J., dissenting). 
113. Id. at 622–23, 244 P.3d at 13 (quoting Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal 
System: Perspectives on State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PUGET 
SOUND L. REV. 491, 507–08 (1984)). 
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Yes, the unconstitutional-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt controversy is 
unimportant because the “standard” (and the debate) rarely occurs. Most 
important, the Washington State Supreme Court has clearly stated that the 
formulation does not mean what it says. In Island County and in School 
Districts’ Alliance, the majority opinions stressed that it is not an 
evidentiary standard, and that in deference to legislative judgment the 
Court simply is “hesitant to strike a duly enacted statute unless fully 
convinced, after a searching legal analysis, that the statute violates the 
constitution.”115 So that’s the standard, not James Bradley Thayer’s 
proposal that courts should refrain from nullifying actions of elected 
lawmakers unless the constitutional mistake is so clear that “it is not open 
to rational question.”116 
Arizona recently tackled this issue in Gallardo v. State,117 and came 
down firmly on the side of jettisoning the jingle.118 Gallardo was a 
“special legislation” case upholding a statute that provided for larger 
 
114. File:  Tea  Tax  Tempest,  WIKIMEDIA  COMMONS, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index. 
php?curid=17947717 [https://perma.cc/2AHT-NBYH]. 
115. Island Cnty. v. State, 135 Wash. 2d 141, 147, 955 P.2d 377, 380 (1998) (citing State v. Smith, 
111 Wash. 2d 1, 17, 759 P.2d 372, 380 (1988) (Utter, J., dissenting)); Sch. Dists.’ All., 170 Wash. 2d 
at 606, 244 P.3d at 4 (quoting Island Cnty., 135 Wash. 2d at 147, 955 P.2d at 380). 
116. Thayer, supra note 23, at 144; see supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text. 
117. 336 P.3d 717 (Ariz. 2014). 
118. Id. at 720. 
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community college district boards in counties with at least three million 
residents (of which there was only one).119 The Arizona State Supreme 
Court majority forthrightly ruled that 
Defendants argue that in determining whether a statute is a special 
law, we must apply a strong presumption in favor of its 
constitutionality, and Plaintiffs must prove its unconstitutionality 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Although prior cases have used 
similar language, it incorrectly states the standard. Determining 
constitutionality is a question of law, which we review de novo. 
Assessing the constitutionality of a law fundamentally differs 
from determining the existence of historical facts, the 
determination of which is subject to deference. We therefore 
disapprove the use of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard 
for making constitutionality determinations.120 
Washington State’s high court ought to do the same and eliminate 
unconstitutional-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt. This is really not so trivial, 
and for several reasons: 
Courts ought to say what they mean. In the United States (and 
certainly in Washington State) our appellate judges pride 
themselves on straightforward explanations for their decisions. It 
is misleading to voice a standard for “hortatory” purposes, 
followed immediately with a statement that, never mind, the court 
is actually applying a different standard. 
“Unconstitutional-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt” might be a bit 
disingenuous. Our Supreme Court justices are a thoughtful and 
honest group of people. But perhaps they toss in “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” as a sop to legislators or voters who might be 
angered by judicial nullification of all the hard work that went 
into passing a new law. As Justice Talmadge wrote, the phrase “is 
simply a hortatory expression” used when the justices are really 
saying that they respect the legislature’s role.121 So—they could 
say just that. 
“Unconstitutional-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt” confuses 
people. Reciting this standard might not confuse members of the 
Washington State Supreme Court, but it can certainly confuse 
lawyers and members of the public who take Supreme Court 
pronouncements at face value. Witness the 2014 law review case 
note criticizing the Court’s constitutional rejection of an initiative 
measure requiring an automatic voter referendum on tax 
 
119. Id. at 726. 
120. Id. at 720 (citations omitted). 
121. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
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increases.122 The author seemed genuinely shocked that the Court 
declined to follow Thayer’s approach, arguing that based on their 
declaration of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, 
Washington judges had a duty to harmonize the statute with the 
constitution if a reasonable interpretation existed, and the 
“judicial branch must uphold the statute in light of this 
reasonable interpretation.”123 
The Washington State Supreme Court possesses several workable 
standards it can and does apply. The best approach is Justice 
Guy’s real standard from Island County that the statute is 
unconstitutional.124 This can be supplemented by Justice Utter’s 
1989 language from Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp.125 that “we follow 
the rule giving every reasonable presumption in favor of the 
constitutionality of the law . . . to avoid substituting our judgment 
for the judgement of the Legislature.”126 There is also Justice 
Robert Finley’s 1974 declaration in Fritz v. Gorton127 that “it is 
not the prerogative nor the function of the judiciary to 
substitute . . . their better judgement” for that of the electorate or 
the legislators unless the relevant statutes “clearly contravene 
state or federal constitutional provisions.”128 Any and all of these 
standards accurately reflect what our high court does when faced 
with constitutional challenges to statutes. So why bother 
including a misleading standard? 
CONCLUSION 
James Bradley Thayer meant well when he promoted the “American 
doctrine” that appellate courts will not overturn a statute unless it is 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Professor Thayer thought he 
was making a case for judicial respect of democratic institutions. But his 
“doctrine” never really caught on at the federal level, and at the state court 
level it is often ignored—even by the courts that regularly voice the 
formulation. Courts have a duty of transparency to the public, so it would 
 
122. Nicholas Carlson, Note, Taxing Judicial Restraint: How Washington’s Supreme Court 
Misinterpreted Its Role and the Washington State Constitution, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 865, 
866 (2014). 
123. Id. at 888. 
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be a useful (though small) improvement if the Washington State Supreme 
Court would decide once and for all to permanently drop the jingle of 
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
